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lead to injustice. In the case of Hessen v. Iowa Automobile Mut. Ins.
Co. (1922, Iowa) 19o N. W. I5O, an innocent purchaser of an automo-
bile from a thief insured it against theft. Subsequently it was stolen
from him and in an action on the policy, it was held in substance4 that
he acquired no title from the thief, and therefore had no insurable
interest. A person is said to have an insurable interest in property,
even where he has neither title nor right in the property, when he stands
in such relation to it that he has legal ground for expecting benefit from
its continued existence, or loss from its destruction.5 The situation of a
thief with reference to the property stolen seems to fall within this rule,
but obvious reasons of policy rebel against its recognition. Clearly those
reasons of policy do not exist in the case of an admittedly innocent
purchaser. Certainly his right to possession, good against all the world
except the true owner, plus his beneficial user, was sufficient basis
for expecting benefit from its continued existence, or loss from its
destruction.,
The law of England is not friendly to skyscrapers. Their erection
may even involve a nuisance and bring their constructor within the rule
of Rylands v. Fletcher.' In Hoare & Co. v. McAlpine & Sons (1922,
Ch.) 39 T. L. R. 97, the defendant was engaged in excavating for new
buildings expected to attain the immense height of 120 feet, "the highest
buildings in the City except St. Paul's." In the process the defendant
encountered one of the arches of "Old London Bridge" in made ground
resting on London clay. , Piles some 38 feet long were driven through
the made ground into the clay to support a concrete "raft," the force
being supplied by a "monkey" which dropped a weight of two and a
half tons from a height of 5 feet four times a minute, or by a steam
hammer delivering 14o blows a minute. The London clay "had a resist-
ance like rubber" and "acted like a fluid in transmiting vibrations."
The result was that the plaintiff's hotel, a building about one hundred
years old, was so affected by the vibration as to become dangerous and
was ordered demolished by the City Corporation. The plaintiff's loss
was accentuated by building lines which left him only eight feet on which
to erect a new building. The court declared that Rylands v. Fletcher
was applicable and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the loss
of his building. "There wvas no justification for its being shaken down
in its declining age by an adventurous and powerful neighbor. It was
an alarming proposition that we should have to consider such a question
as: When did an old building lose its right to protection?"
'The policy contained a "sole and unconditional ownership" clause, but this
is usually held to be merely a warranty of good faith of the insured and not an
absolute warranty of perfect title. Vance, Imsurance (1904) 445.
'Ibid. io6.
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